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compositional and dynamic management 
of behavior. Continuing some earlier dis-
cussions about the link between this kind of 
neural models and the conscious appraisal 
of  time  (Tani  2004),  Tani  suggests  that 
when anticipation successively predicts the 
sensorimotor flow during the execution of 
a familiar behavioral sequence (e.g. driv-
ing on a familiar road), there is nothing 
to be “conscious” about. However, when a 
“breakdown” occurs, i.e., when there is a 
gap between the anticipation of the top-
down system and the actual sensorimotor 
flow (e.g. a child crossing the street), the 
system  has  to  perform  intensive  regres-
sion, which is an adjustment of the “self”. 
This bottom-up process may result in the 
conscious experience associated with the 
unexpected event.
Compositionality and consciousness are 
likely to be intrinsically linked. The experi-
ence of driving a car is made of continuous 
shifts between unconscious “incorporated” 
sequences and small moments of awareness. 
To understand these bottom-up and top-
down dynamics, we need plausible neural 
models of the emergence of compositional 
behavior. Tani’s neurorobotic experiments 
are important steps in this direction.
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Learning to drive a car is a long and tedious 
process. For most of us, it takes many pain-
ful hours of training. At the beginning, the 
car is an external device, reacting in unpre-
dictable ways. But progressively, we get used 
to some of the dynamics of the complex 
machine. We have to simultaneously learn 
basic control operations like switching the 
gears and pushing the brake, and to com-
bine the operations into higher-level behav-
ioral chunks like starting,   stopping, turning, 
parking, and passing another car. Day after 
day we get used to the car’s space occupa-
tion and the time necessary to slow down. 
The car becomes like our second skin. We 
learn to adapt each skill to specific contexts 
such as starting on a steep street, turning on 
a wet road, passing a long truck or park-
ing  in  a  busy  Parisian  boulevard.  Based 
on  the  chunks  we  can  easily  anticipate 
and look ahead. We plan long trips by just 
focusing on important direction decisions 
and assuming that all the rest should run 
smoothly. For those who commute everyday 
by car, some driving trips are so familiar 
that the chunks can be done with almost no 
conscious control. Driving has become as 
natural as walking: an unconscious experi-
ence. However, as in walking, if something 
unexpected happens (e.g. a child crossing 
the street and a strange behavior of a car 
due to a flat tire) we are always ready to 
take control again and rapidly adapt to the 
new situation.
Tani  (2007)  doesn’t  write  about  cars. 
However, the article gives precious insights 
on how neural circuits can perform similar 
to the process we just described. It shows 
very  convincingly  how  certain  kinds  of 
recurrent  neural  networks  can  acquire 
compositionality  without  using  symbols. 
Compositionality  is  the  property  of  sys-
tems that can be decomposed into reusable 
parts. Linguistic systems are typical exam-
ples of compositional systems. Discourses 
are combinations of sentences that are com-
bination of words, which are combination 
of phonemes. Most sensorimotor behaviors, 
such as driving, are also intrinsically com-
positional, reusing basic primitives, chunks 
or schemas. It seems to be a fundamental 
feature for achieving complexity.
Compositional systems are very com-
mon in symbolic artificial intelligence. In 
these  models,  each  chunk  is  an  explicit 
structure that can be easily manipulated, 
organized  in  hierarchies  and  used  for 
building plans. Unfortunately, most of the 
symbolic systems have difficulties in deal-
ing  with  real-world  dynamics  for  which 
plans  must  be  constantly  reassessed  and 
the chunks must be continuously adapted to 
deal with the present situation. Tani’s neu-
ral model not only shows that a dynamical 
system can exhibit compositional properties 
without having an explicit notion of chunk 
or schema, but also convincingly demon-
strates that it can deal with complex real-
work interaction in real time. The neural 
network has to discover by itself how to 
segment the continuous sensorimotor flow 
into sequences of reusable segments and 
to simultaneously arrange the chunks into 
higher-level sequences. The challenge is that 
both the processes have to run concurrently 
as in any real-world learning. The corner-
stone of Tani’s model is that it combines 
dynamic  interactions  between  top-down 
look-ahead  anticipations  and  a  bottom 
regression process, permitting to re-situate 
the system if something goes wrong in the 
prediction. It is a wonderful illustration of 
self-organization at work.
There is something more. Tani’s model 
tells  us  something  important  about  the 
conscious experience associated with such 